Abstract. Leakage-resilient cryptography aims at capturing side-channel attacks within the provable security framework. Currently there exists a plethora of schemes with provably secure guarantees against a variety of side-channel attacks. However, meeting the strongest security levels (resilience against continual leakage attacks) under the weakest assumptions leads currently to costly schemes. Additionally, recent results show the impossibility to achieve the strongest leakage-resilient security levels for cryptosystems whose secret key is uniquely determined by its public key. The above justies the use of stronger assumptions to achieve simpler, more ecient schemes, since most deployed and practical cryptosystems satisfy the above-mentioned uniqueness of the secret key property. In particular, the Schnorr-based leakage-resilient digital signature schemes proposed up to now are built by gluing together -copies of the basic signature scheme, resulting in a public key that admits exponentiallymany secret keys. Furthermore, the space needed to store the secret key material is proportional to the leakage tolerated by these schemes. We aim at designing a leakage-resilient variant of the Schnorr signature scheme whose secret key's storage space is constant, independently of the amount of leakage that it can tolerate. We assume that at any given time only the parts of the memory in use leak (split-state/only computation leaks information model); we ease the problem of exhibiting a security reduction by relying on generic groups (generic bilinear group model). We proceed by rst proposing a pairing analogue of the Schnorr signature scheme, that we next transform to include split signing key updates. We give a leakage-resilience lower bound in generic bilinear groups against continual leakage attacks for the new scheme.
Introduction
Over the last 30 years the theory of cryptography has been robustly built. It started with the proposal of simple, elegant and sound denitions [19, 13, 20] , it was followed by plausibility results under the weakest assumptions, and currently culminating in the practical constructions used nowadays by the information security community [1] .
Concurrently, the theory and practice of cryptanalysis has been no less successful. In particular, the exploitation of the physical nature of the devices where cryptographic primitives are run, pioneered from an academic perspective in [24, 25, 9] , has rendered many of the beautiful and theoretically robust constructions broken. Typical examples of side channel information are the analysis of primitives' running-time, power consumption or electromagnetic radiation leak, to name just but the most well-known.
The area of provable security that provides security reductions even in the presence of secret key leakage is called leakage-resilient cryptography and it has been an increasingly active eld in recent years. In this work we assume leakage to be continual leakage, i.e. the useful leakage data per signature invocation is bounded in length, but unbounded overall; and adhere to the independent leakage/split-state model, meaning that the computation can be divided into rounds, where each such round access independent parts of the memory that leak independently.
The continual split-state leakage model has been previously used in the works [15, 31, 23, 16, 18, 26] . The rst assumption is restrictive but overall reasonable; in practice many side-channel attacks only exploit a polylogarithmic amount of information. The second assumption allows us to divide the memory of a device, at every computing step, into two parts -an active and a passive part. The part of the memory being currently accessed by a computation is the active part, and only the active part leaks information at any given time. We stress that even if leakage is local with respect to each part of the memory, it still captures some global functions of the secret key, for instance any ane leakage function. We refer to the work by Dziembowski and Faust [14] and by Faust et al. [17] for a discussion on the signicance and limitations of this leakage model.
In the last few years the interplay between provable security and side-channel attacks has experienced great progress, as the works [22, 16, 8, 11, 27, 7] bear witness for the case of digital signatures. However, the schemes that do not use any idealized assumption (random oracle, generic groups), are much more involved than their non-leakage counterparts and depart signicantly from the schemes in the standard cryptography tool-box. Interestingly, recent work by Wichs [38] seems to indicate that it might be impossible to achieve continual leakage-resilience for cryptosystems whose secret key is uniquely determined by its public key, unless we weaken the security model. Furthermore, existing strongly secure proposals are not yet ecient enough. A rough estimation of the eciency of current leakage-resilient schemes is that they are a linear number of times in the security parameter slower than their non-leakage counterparts.
In this work we study a signature scheme secure against continual leakage in the split-state model that builds on the Schnorr signature scheme [33] . Notice that several works [21, 3, 16] have already built leakage-resilient signature schemes based on Schnorr. All of these works conrm the nding by Wichs: they are built by gluing together several copies of the basic Schnorr signature scheme (a technique that was rst used by Okamoto [30] ), and thus given its public key there are exponentially many possible secret keys. The works [21, 3] only allow a bounded leakage during the life-time of the protocol, although in their model every part of the memory is susceptible to leak (as opposed to the split-state model); the work [16] uses the split-state model and allows roughly 1/36 leakage ratio at every signing step, but the number of signature queries is bounded in advance. Our goal is to provide a Schnorr-like signature scheme where the secret key material to be stored is constant at any time, since in the aforementioned works the secret keys' storage is proportional to the leakage ratio allowed. In particular we propose a scheme where the secret key is uniquely determined by its public key, the secret key consists of only two group elements at any given time and it is unforgeable even if the number of adversarial signature queries is not known in advance.
Our positive results are of course far from the ideal achievement, that is, to prove leakage-resilience of the original Schnorr scheme instantiated over any cryptographic group G where the discrete logarithm problem is assumed to be hard. However, this is presently out of reach using standard techniques [38] . This is why we state our theorems with respect to a transposition of the modied Schnorr signature scheme to pairing groups, where the secret key is no longer showing that our transposition of the Schnorr signature scheme to pairing groups is existentially unforgeable [20] in the GBG model. This is achieved by showing that the security reduction in the generic group model [36] for elliptic-curve based Schnorr signatures recently given by Neven, Smart and Warinschi [29] can be translated to the GBG and allows to deal with data leakage. Secondly, we modify the pairing-based Schnorr scheme by multiplicatively sharing X = X 1 ·X 2 , where X 1 , X 2 ∈ G, and by breaking the signing scheme into two phases, each one using the corresponding share X 1 or X 2 . Again, at each new signature invocation a fresh sharing (X 1 , X 2 ) of X is computed. Our main theorem (Theorem 2) states that allowing λ bits of leakage at each phase of every round overall decreases the security of the scheme by a factor of at most 2 2λ in our leakage model.
The GBG model has been previously used for stating leakage-resilience properties by Kiltz and Pietrzak [23] , and Galindo and Vivek [18] . Kiltz and Pietrzak propose a bilinear version of the ElGamal key encapsulation mechanism which enjoys provable leakage-resilience in the presence of continual leakage. Their scheme is very ecient, less than a handful of times slower than standard ElGamal. Galindo and Vivek propose a leakage-resilient existentially unforgeable signature scheme based on the Boneh-Boyen identity-based encryption scheme [4] . Their scheme enjoys eciency and leakage-resilience properties similar to the scheme by Kiltz and Pietrzak. Our Schnorr-like scheme has eciency comparable to that of Galindo and Vivek's scheme. Additionally it is so far the only Schnorr-based leakage-resilient scheme whose secret key is uniquely determined by its public key (thus bypassing the impossibility result by Wichs [38] at the cost of the GBG assumption), and the secret key material storage is constant and independent of the leakage rate (two elements in the pairing base group G).
Organization of the Paper. We start in Section 2 by recalling some basic facts and denitions. In Section 3, we introduce a bilinear variant of the Schnorr signature scheme and prove its security in the GBG model. In Section 4, we split the secret state of the bilinear Schnorr scheme and prove its leakage resilience under continual leakage in the GBG model. Finally, we conclude in Section 5 by summarizing the achievements and limitations of our methodology.
Denitions
In this section, we recollect some basic notions of security of signature schemes, bilinear groups, and the generic bilinear group model. We also describe the model of leakage we shall consider in this paper and formulate a denition of security of signature schemes in the presence of continual leakage. We adapt the leakage model specied in [23] to signature schemes, exactly as done in [18] .
Let Z denote the set of integers and Z p (p > 0) denote, depending upon the context, either the set of integers {0, 1, . . . , p − 1} or the ring modulo p. We denote a random sampling of an element a ∈ A from a set A, and also denote a (possibly probabilistic) output of an algorithm A, by a ← A. If we want to explicitly denote the randomness r used during the sampling/output, then we do so by s r ← S. Unless otherwise mentioned or implicit from the context, any sampling is from an uniform distribution. The symbol := is used to dene a notation in an expression, as in A := Z, or to explicitly indicate an output of a deterministic algorithm or a function.
A signature scheme Π = (KeyGen, Sign, Verify) consists of three probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms KeyGen, Sign, and Verify. Let κ denote the security parameter. KeyGen(κ) on input κ produces a public-and secret-key pair (pk, sk) along with other public parameters PP. The algorithm Sign(sk, m) on input a secret key sk and a message m ∈ M , where M is the message space, outputs a signature σ. Verify(pk, m, σ) on input a public key pk, a message m ∈ M and a signature σ, outputs a bit b = 1 meaning valid, or b = 0 meaning invalid. We require the following correctness requirement to be satised by Π:
The standard security notion for signature schemes is existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message attacks (EUF-CMA), and it is is dened through the following experiment: 
Leakage Model
We split the secret state into two parts that reside in dierent parts of the memory, and structure any computation that involves access to the secret state into a sequence of steps. Any step accesses only one part of the secret state (active part) and the other part (passive part) is assumed not to leak in the current step of computation. For simplicity, we dene a security notion for leakage-resilient signature schemes assuming that the signing process is carried out in two steps.
We also refer to a single invocation of the signature generation algorithm as a round.
Let us consider the problem of achieving leakage resilience under continual leakage even when a signicant fraction of the bits of the secret state are leaked per round. Then it is necessary that the secret state must be stateful, i.e. the secret state must be refreshed during every round [23] . Otherwise, after many rounds the entire secret state will be completely leaked. 
In the above expression, r i and r i are the randomness used by Sign * 1 and Sign * 2 , respectively. The parameter w i is some state information passed onto Sign * 2 by Sign * 1 . The signature σ i is generated for the message m i , and the internal state is updated from (S i−1 , S i−1 ) to (S i , S i ).
We model the leakage during signature generation by giving an adversary A access to a leakage oracle Ω leak (Si−1,S i−1 ) (·). This oracle, in addition to giving A signatures for the messages of its choice, also allows A to obtain leakage from the computation used to generate signatures. More precisely, let λ be a leakage parameter. During the i th signing round, A is allowed to specify two functions f i and h i , each of range {0, 1}
λ , that can be eciently computed. The outputs of the leakage functions are
Since the value of m can be included in the description of f i and h i , hence it is not explicitly included as an input. Note that it also possible for A to specify h i after obtaining Λ i . But for simplicity of the exposition, we only describe here the case where f i and h i are specied along with the message m i to the oracle. The security of the signature scheme Π * in the presence of (continual) leakage is dened through the following experiment Sign-Forge-Leak Π * (A, κ, λ). In the description below, |f i | refers to the length of the output of f i . 
Bilinear Groups
Let BGen(κ) be a probabilistic bilinear group generator that outputs (G, G T , p, e, g) such that:
1. G = g and G T are (multiplicatively written) cyclic groups of prime order p with binary operations · and , respectively. The size of p is κ bits.
2. e : G × G → G T is a bilinear map that is:
ab .
(b) non-degenerate: e(g, g) = 1.
Such a group G is said to be a bilinear group if the above properties hold and the group operations in G and G T , and the map e are eciently computable. The group G is called as base group and G T as target group.
Generic Bilinear Group Model
The generic bilinear group (GBG) model [6] is an extension of the generic group model [36] . The encodings of the elements of G and G T are given by random bijective maps ξ : Z p → Ξ and ξ T : Z p → Ξ T , respectively, where Ξ and Ξ T are sets of bit-strings. The group operations in G and G T , and evaluation of the bilinear map e are performed by three public oracles O, O T and O e , respectively, dened as follows.
We assume that the (xed) generator g of G satises g = ξ (1), and also the (xed) generator g T of G T satises g T = e(g, g) = ξ T (1). The encoding of g is provided to all users of the group oracles. The users can thus eciently sample random elements in both G and G T . We further assume that Ξ ∩ Ξ T = φ, |Ξ| = |Ξ T | = p, and that the elements of Ξ and Ξ T are eciently recognizable. For instance, the encodings in Ξ can comprise of the binary representation of the set {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}, where every string begins with`0' and all are of uniform length. The encodings in Ξ T are similarly dened but instead begin with`1'. Since the encodings are eciently recognizable, the queries to a group oracle with an invalid encoding can be detected and an error can be raised. For simplicity, we assume that the users' queries to the oracles are all valid.
Min-Entropy
Let X be a nite random variable with probability distribution Pr. The min-
. Min-entropy is a standard measure of the worst-case predictability of a random variable. Let Z be a random variable. The average conditional min-entropy of
Average conditional min-entropy is a measure of the worstcase predictability of a random variable given a correlated random variable.
The following result is a variant of the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma [34, 39, 18] .
is negligible (in log p).
Basic Signature Scheme
We propose a bilinear variant of the Schnorr signature scheme [32, 33] .
Let H : {0, 1} * → Z p be a hash function. The signature scheme Π Sc = (KeyGen Sc , Sign Sc , Verify Sc ), dened on the message space {0, 1} * , is as follows:
The public key is pk := (PP, X T , H) and the secret key is sk := X.
We now prove the security of the above scheme in the GBG model relative to two hardness assumptions about the hash function H that were introduced in [29] , and which are recalled below. These two assumptions are weaker than collision-resistance [29] . We adapt the proof techniques of [29] to the bilinear setting.
Denition 3. [Random-Prex (Second-) Preimage problem [29] ] The advantage of an adversary A in solving the Random-Prex Preimage ( RPP) problem (respectively, Random-Prex Second-Preimage ( RPSP) problem) for a hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z p , with prex in a set of bit-strings D, is given by
where the probability is taken over R and the coins of A. The main idea is to use A to construct an adversary B that solves both the RPP[Ξ T ] and the RPSP[Ξ T ] problems for the hash function H. B will simulate EUF-CMA experiment for A in the naive way, through the game G that we later describe below. In the game, B also simulates the generic bilinear group oracles in the usual way by maintaining lists of pairs of encodings and polynomials that represent the relation amongst group elements. Let C be a challenger trying to prove the hardness of both the RPP[Ξ T ] and the RPSP[Ξ T ] problems for H against B.
There are only two possibilities for A to output a forgery:
A uses a signature previously obtained to output a forgery (on a distinct message).
2.
A does not output a previously obtained signature as a forgery.
Note that in a forgery of type 1, the random prex for the hash function input (during verication) is the same as that for the corresponding previously obtained signature. In this case B will attempt to solve the RPSP[Ξ T ] problem for H. There are two issues that B needs to address in this case to solve the RPSP problem. First, it must correctly guess at the beginning of the simulation when A outputs a forgery of type 1 (and accordingly inform C that it attempts to solve the RPSP problem). Secondly, B needs to guess a priori which one of the previous signatures will A use for the forgery. Then during that step B needs to forward the corresponding message to the (now RPSP) challenger C to obtain a random prex as part of its RPSP challenge. This random prex will be used as the encoding of the corresponding element g t T during the above signing step.
B solves the RPSP problem by forwarding to its (now RPSP) challenger C the forged message output by A. Note that the probability that B will succeed in both the guesses is at least 1 2q
.
In the case of forgery of type 2, B will attempt to solve the RPP[Ξ T ] problem for H. Again, B must rst guess correctly when this type of forgery occurs (and accordingly inform C that it attempts to solve the RPP problem). Secondly, B must commit to a value γ to obtain a random prex R ∈ Ξ T as part of a RPP challenge. Eventually when A outputs a forgery on a (distinct) message m, it must turn out that the encoding of the corresponding g t T must be R and that H(R||m) = γ. The tricky question is how to commit to the value γ before seeing R and m? We overcome this problem by assuming that A executes the verication algorithm Verify Sc (·) before outputting its forgery (Y, γ), as done in [29] . This is w.l.o.g. because for every adversary that does not verify its forgery, we can build an adversary that has the same advantage but veries its attempted forgery. This step guarantees that the elements Y ∈ G and g t T ∈ G T appears as outputs of group oracles, with Y appearing before g t T . We bound the probability that Y appears later than g t T to be RPP .
Hence B simply needs to guess a priori which group oracle query outputs g t T . During this step, B recovers the value of γ using the coecients of the polynomials representing Y and g t T , as explained in (7) and proved in Lemma 3. Note that B also needs to guess a priori which element will be output as Y . B forwards the value of γ to the (now RPP) challenger C and obtains the random prex R, which it uses as the encoding of g t T . Note that the probability that B will succeed in all the three guesses is at least 1 2(3q) 2 , where we later show that the number of elements to choose from is at most 3q in both the cases. We would like to note that recovering γ in the proof of [29] (for the original Schnorr signature scheme) is easier than in the bilinear setting. This is because in [29] it involved guessing an element in only one list and the polynomials involved are all binomials.
We now formally describe the game G. The description of the group oracles is typical for proofs in the generic group model (see [36, 28, 5, 18] ).
Description of Game G: Initially, B will choose a random bit β C $ ← {0, 1}. This bit decides which of the two problems RPSP (if β C = 0) or RPP (if β C = 1) will B attempt to solve using the forgery output by A. If β C = 0, then B randomly chooses i * $ ← {1, . . . , q}, else it randomly chooses i * , j * $ ← {1, . . . , 3q}. The quantity i * indicates the step in which B interacts with C to obtain a random prex ξ T,i * ∈ Ξ T . This step may be a signature query (if β C = 0) or a group oracle query to O T (if β C = 1). More on this will be discussed later when describing the simulation of signature queries and queries to the group oracle O T . Let X, {T i : i ≥ 1}, {U i : i ≥ 1} and {V i : i ≥ 1} be indeterminates, and {m i : i ≥ 1} be bit-strings (messages) that are chosen by A. Intuitively, these (or other) polynomials represent the relation amongst the group elements that are output by a group oracle, or guessed by A. The indeterminate X corresponds to the quantity x (discrete logarithm of the secret key), whereas T i corresponds to the parameter t i chosen in the i th signing step (1 ≤ i ≤ q Ω ). Since A can query the group oracles with representations (from Ξ and Ξ T ) not previously obtained from the group oracles, in order to accommodate this case, we introduce the indeterminates U i , V i . The U i correspond to the guessed elements of G, whereas V i correspond to the guessed elements of G T . We denote the lists {T i : i ≥ 1}, {U i : i ≥ 1} and {V i : i ≥ 1} by {T}, {U} and {V}, respectively.
B maintains three lists of pairs
The entries F 1,i ∈ Z p [X, {U}, {T}], F T,i ∈ Z p [X, {U}, {V}, {T}] are multivariate polynomials over Z p , whereas ξ 1,i , ξ Ω,i , and ξ T,i are bit-strings in the encoding sets Ξ (of G), Ξ, and Ξ T (of G T ), respectively. We have m i ∈ {0, 1} * and
The polynomials in lists L and L T correspond to elements of G and G T , respectively, that A will ever be able to compute or guess. The list L Ω records the signatures obtained by A on the messages m i of its choice. The values τ 1 , τ T and τ Ω denote the respective list counters.
) }, and L Ω = {}. The bit-strings ξ 1,1 , ξ T,1 are set to random distinct strings from Ξ and Ξ T , respectively. We assume that there is some ordering among the strings in the sets Ξ and Ξ T (say, lexicographic ordering), so that given a string ξ 1,i or ξ T,i , it is possible to eciently determine its index in the lists, if it exists. The initial state of the lists L and L T correspond to the generator of G and the public key, respectively. Else if β C = 0 or i * = τ Ω , then B sets ξ T,τ T to a random string distinct from those already present in L T .
, and appends L Ω and provides A with (m τ Ω , ξ Ω,τ Ω , γ τ Ω ).
Group Operation of G:
The calls made by A to the group oracle O are modeled as follows. For group operations in G, A provides B with two operands (bit-strings) ξ 1,i , ξ 1,j (1 ≤ i, j ≤ τ 1 ) in L and also species whether to multiply or divide them. B answers the query by rst incrementing the counter τ 1 := τ 1 + 1, and computes the polynomial F 1,τ1 := F 1,i ±F 1,j . If F 1,τ1 = F 1,k for some k < τ 1 , then B sets ξ 1,τ1 := ξ 1,k . Otherwise, ξ 1,τ1 is set to a random string distinct from those already present in L. The pair (F 1,τ1 , ξ 1,τ1 ) is appended to L and B provides A with ξ 1,τ1 . Note that the (total) degree of the polynomials F 1,i in L is at most one.
If A queries O with an encoding ξ not previously output by the oracle, then A increments the counter τ 1 := τ 1 + 1, sets ξ 1,τ1 := ξ, and sets F 1,τ1 := U τ1 . The pair (F 1,τ1 , ξ 1,τ1 ) is appended to L. This step is carried out for each guessed operand.
Group Operation of G T : The group oracle O T is modeled similar to O, instead appropriately updating the counter τ T , and appending the list L T with the output (F T,τ T , ξ T,τ T ). B provides A with ξ T,τ T . For guessed operands in G T , a new variable T τ T is introduced instead.
Pairing Operation: For a pairing operation, A queries B with two operands
B rst increments τ T := τ T + 1, and then computes the polynomial F T,τ T := F 1,i · F 1,j . Again, if F T,τ T = F T,k for some k < τ T , then B sets ξ T,τ T := ξ T,k . Otherwise, ξ T,τ T is set to a random string distinct from those already present in L T . The pair (F T,τ T , ξ T,τ T ) is appended to L T , and B provides A with ξ T,τ T . Note that the degree of the polynomials F T,i in L T is at most two.
RPP Challenge: Recollect that B has earlier sampled i * , j * $ ← {1, . . . , 3q}. Since A makes at most q O < q group oracle queries and that in each query A can guess at most two new elements, it is easy to see that lists L and L T together have at most 3(q O + q Ω ) ≤ 3q elements. Hence |L| + |L T | ≤ 3q. 
where a X is the coecient of X in F T,i * , a i is the coecient of
, and γ i is, as dened previously, the hash value in the i th signature query. If F 1,j * does not exist, or i * > τ T at the end of the game G, then B completes the RPP challenge with C by returning arbitrary values. Else, B passes γ * ∈ Z p to C to obtain a random prex ξ T,i * ∈ Ξ T , as part of an RPP challenge. If F T,τ T = F T,k for some k < τ T and ξ T,i * = ξ T,k , then B completes the RPP challenge with C by returning arbitrary values (Abort). Else, if there is no such
If B has made right guesses for i * and j * , then F 1,j * and F T,i * corresponds to the forgery and satisfy
where γ is the hash value corresponding to the forgery. Note again that both the polynomials exist (in case of successful forgery) because we assume that A always veries its attempted forgery before it is output. Lemma 3 below proves that indeed γ * = γ. Because A has access to the oracle O T , it is easy to see that it is not possible to recover γ from F T,i * alone.
Lemma 3. Let F T,i * = F 1,j * − γX, as computed in (8) . Let a X be the coecient of X in F T,i * , and a i be the coecient of T i in F 1,j * (1 ≤ i ≤ q Ω ). Also let γ i be the hash value in the i th signature query. End of Game G: When A terminates it outputs (m, (ξ 1,α , γ)) ∈ {0, 1} * × Ξ ×Z p , where ξ 1,α ∈ L and 1 ≤ α ≤ τ 1 . This corresponds to the forgery output by A in the actual interaction. B simply forwards m to its challenger C.
Let Forge denote the event of successful forgery. Next, B chooses random values x, {u}, {v}, {t} ← Z p for the indeterminates X, {U}, {V}, {T}, respectively. Then it evaluates the polynomials in lists L and L T . B will abort if:
Let Collide denote either of the above events, i.e. a collision occurring in lists L and/or L T . This completes the description of game G and simulator B. . Summing up over at most τ1 2 distinct pairs (i, j), the probability that the condition 1 above holds is at most τ1
Analysis of Pr
. Similarly, the probability that the condition 2 above holds is at most
. Using (6) we obtain 
In other words, A uses a signature previously obtained to output its forgery on a distinct message. Let Forge 1 denote this event. If β C = 0 and i * = i, then B can successfully use the forgery to solve the RPSP[Ξ T ] problem for H. This is because B will attempt to solve the RPSP problem only when β C = 0, the probability of which is 1 2
. Since at the beginning itself B will decide at which signing step (step i * ) it will interact with C when β C = 0, the probability that i * = i is at least
. Hence the advantage of B in solving RPSP problem is at least 1 2q
is an upper bound on the probability that B does not Abort due to a repeated entry in L T during RPSP challenge step. It may be noted that if B attempts to solve the RPP problem using this type of forgery, then Abort will occur with overwhelming probability. Therefore, The quantity RPP appearing above is an upper bound on the probability that the entry (F T,i , ξ T,i ) does not appear before (F 1,α , ξ 1,α ). Because F T,i = F 1,α − γX (c.f. (8)) and that encodings are random, this means that A is able to compute the value γ even before getting an encoding ξ T,i such that H(ξ T,i ||m) = γ. In other words, A has solved the RPP[Ξ T ] problem for H.
From (9), (10) and (11), we have Pr 
A Leakage-Resilient Signature Scheme
In this section, we describe a leakage-resilient variant Π * Sc of the scheme Π Sc . We use the techniques of [23] to transform Π Sc to Π * Sc . A major dierence between the two variants is that the secret key X = g x of Π Sc is now split into two parts as 
x and X T := e(g, X) = e(g, g)
x . The public key is pk := (PP, X T , H) and the secret key is sk
The index i used above refers to the number of times the signing algorithm has been invoked. For i ≥ 1, let Z i := i j=0 l j . The correctness property of Π * Sc
and h i () that the adversary species to the signing oracle would take the form (1) and (2) Since the input/output behaviour of Π * Sc and Π Sc is identical, from Theorem 1 we obtain that Π * Sc is secure in the GBG model in a non-leakage setting. 
Let us briey sketch the main ideas of the proof. Working on the lines of (9), the advantage of A is bounded by its success probabilities conditioned on the event whether or not a collision has occurred in the lists consisting of elements of G and G T . It is important to note that the proofs for the non-leakage setting (i.e. proof of Theorem 1) and the leakage setting would be the same conditioned on the fact that a collision has not occurred. The reason is that in the event of no collision, the adversary must either solve the RPP or the RPSP problem for the hash function in order to output a forgery (let us recall that a solution to either the RPP or the RPSP problem implies a collision for the hash function). Hence leakage on the secret state will not be useful in this case. Hence the success probability of A against Π Sc and Π * Sc is the same in the event of no collision (that includes the event of guessing the representations of group elements using partial information about them).
However the probability that a collision occurs in the leakage setting is increased by a factor of at most 2 2λ . This is because when A has access to leakage
) during i th signature query, then in adversary's view the parameters t i , l i (i ≥ 1) are no longer uniformly distributed even though they are still independent. Hence A can now cause collisions among polynomials (in Conditions 1-2 on page 12) with increased probability.
Each value t i can only be leaked by f i , hence at most λ bits of t i can be leaked.
Since l i appears in both f i () and h i (), at most 2λ bits of l i can be leaked. The only useful information that the leakage functions can provide to A is about the secret key X and the values t i . This is because the values l i are independent of the signatures generated. However A can use the leakages of l i to eventually leak X. If A is able to compute X, then it can trivially forge a signature on a distinct message. The event of no collision, and the fact that X is not a linear combination of the inputs to the leakage functions, guarantees that A is unable to compute X.
Proof. Let A be a (Γ -time, q-query) adversary that can break the security of Π * Sc . Hence A can make totally at most q group oracle, pairing oracle and signing oracle queries, and runs in time at most Γ . In the count of q, even group oracle queries by leakage functions f i , h i (i ≥ 1) specied by A are also included. Let the adversary A play the game G described below. This game is an extension of game G described in the proof of Theorem 1. To avoid repetition, we only describe here the extensions that are not part of game G. Let {L} denote the list of indeterminates {L i : 1 ≤ i ≤ q Ω } that correspond to the values l i in Π * Sc . 
where The game G proceeds exactly as game G except that A can also obtain leakage through functions f i and h i in the i th signature query. In particular, when A terminates it outputs (m, (ξ 1,α , γ)) ∈ {0, 1} * × Ξ × Z p , where ξ 1,α ∈ L and 1 ≤ α ≤ τ 1 . Let us denote by Forge * the event of successful forgery by A. On the lines of (9) 
As mentioned before, conditioned on the event Collide * , the view of the adversary A will be same in both the games G and G. This is because in both the cases A will get to see only distinct group elements. Hence, from (11), we have Proof. To compute the required probability, the polynomials in lists L,
are evaluated by choosing values from Z p according to (independent) distributions with min-entropy at least log p − 2λ. This is because A can obtain at most 2λ bits of leakage about l i (i = 0, . . . , q Ω ), and at most λ bits of t i (i = 1, . . . , q Ω ). According to Lemma 1, the values l i , t i have minentropy at least log p − 2λ in the view of A. 
Conclusions
In this work we presented the pairing-based split Schnorr scheme and quantied its security against independent and continual leakage in the generic bilinear group model. In particular, we showed that allowing λ bits of leakage at each of the two phases of every round in the proposed scheme can be compared to decreasing the security of the pairing-based Schnorr scheme (without leakage)
by a factor of at most 2 2λ in our leakage model.
Undoubtedly, the main advantage of our approach lies on its practicality:
signing takes at most 5 exponentiations in G plus 1 exponentiation in G T ; verication takes 1 pairing plus 1 exponentiation in G T . A suitable bilinear pairing group to implement our modication of the Schnorr scheme is the pairingfriendly curve BN-128 studied by Scott in [35] . Thus while our scheme oers continual leakage-resilience, its eciency is comparable to that of standard pairingbased signature schemes [37] . This is currently out of reach for schemes that oer EUF-CMA security against continual leakage and dispense with the generic group model, be it in the standard or the random oracle models.
It is interesting to compare the relative eciency and strength of our scheme and the FKPR scheme by Faust et al. [16] . The latter has a weak form of EUF-CMA security against continual independent leakages in the random oracle model, where the adversary can ask at most for D signatures queries, for D xed before the key generation phase. The main advantage of that construction with respect to ours is that it can be implemented over any group G where the DL problem is conjectured to be hard (our scheme needs pairing-based groups). Let us now examine its disadvantages against our scheme, which are all related to its practicality. The signer in the FKPR scheme needs to maintain a state consist- 
